Abstract— In a recent conference (ICSSSM 2010), Eun-Jun Yooni and Kee-Young proposed the two-pass elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol EECKE-1N that according to the authors is more efficient that ECKE-1N. In this paper we point out that the protocol proposed by the aforementioned authors is in fact the elliptic curve version of the MTI/C0 family of key agreement protocols which suffer from a well-known vulnerability against a particular type of key-compromise impersonation attack.
Index Terms— Key agreement protocols, elliptic curves, key-compromise impersonation.
M. A. Strangio is with the Department of Mathematics, University of Rome “Roma Tre” (e-mail: strangio@mat.uniroma3.it).
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Cite: Maurizio Adriano Strangio, "On the Feasibility of Key Compromise Impersonation Attacks against the Elliptic Curve Version of the MTI/C0 Key Agreement Protocol," International Journal of Information and Electronics Engineering vol. 2, no. 5, pp. 810-812, 2012.